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Abstract
Since the 1990s, a new organizational form of the administrative system in France has been steadily
redefining relations between central administrations and local units of the state. Labelled “the steering state”
or the “managerial state”, this new paradigm hinges on separating the strategic functions of steering and
controlling the state from the operational functions of execution and policy implementation. The making of
this new form of state organization involves two parallel processes: political and cognitive. For one thing,
the adoption of concrete measures for “government at distance” results from power struggles between three
major ministries (the ministries of the Interior, Budget and Civil Service). For another, a new legitimate
“categorization of the state” is being formed in the major committees involved in the reform process of the
1990s; it is carried forward by top civil servants and inspired by the ideas of New Public Management.
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There have been numerous analyses by scholars in the field of public administration of the
neomanagerial reforms of bureaucracies launched in many Western countries since the 1980s (for
good overviews, Pollitt and Boukaert, 2004; Christensen and Lægreid, 2002). Broadly speaking,
these policies bring together various executive or legislative initiatives directed at the admi-
nistrative system and aim to change the main rules constituting the Western bureaucracies set
up between the 19th and the mid-20th centuries: political–administrative relationships; organi-
zational structuring of hierarchy; recruitment, career and working conditions for public sector
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employees; mode of allocation, accountability and control of public expenditure; relationships
between public administrations and their users. These public policies are specific for at least two
reasons: they correspond to “constituting” policy issues (i.e., the setting-up or reorganizations
of institutions); they claim a general applicability of their principles and instruments to all the
different organizations, levels of government, bureaus and officials making up a national admi-
nistrative system. Of course, their influence should not be overestimated: public bureaucracies
change through many other channels than as a result of administrative reforms. Internal and auto-
nomous reforms within ministries, generated by new policies and environments, changes in state
activities and their impacts on administrations (Duran and Thœnig, 1996) or new practices of
street-level bureaucrats (Weller, 1999) are important driving forces for administrative change.
However, over twenty years, administrative reform policies have brought about significant reor-
ganizations of state structures and the emergence of new institutions: consider, for instance, the
major changes that occurred in the British administrative system with the creation of execu-
tive agencies, each specializing in a particular public policy, in place of ministerial departments
(James, 2003); the reform of public sector employment in Italy, where the privatization of the
working relationship means that the rules regarding the careers of public employees are defined
by employment contracts (Capano, 2003); or the strong expectations raised by the reform of the
French budget procedure, the Institutional Act on Budget Legislation (Loi organique relative aux
lois de ﬁnances [LOLF]; passed into law in France on 1st August 2001; implemented from 2006),
which entailed the use of many performance management tools that are also dominant in other
countries.
In this article, we will defend the idea that studying the way the French state’s organizational
form was constructed and negotiated in the 1990s can be a productive approach to capturing
changes in the French administrative system. In particular, our objective is to understand how
the chains of hierarchical authority that govern relations between different politicoadministrative
levels (ministers, central administrations, local units of the state, etc.) on strategic issues such as
distribution of areas of competence, resources, responsibilities and modes of control have been
challenged and transformed. These changes can partly be seen as an intellectually driven revolution
caused by the growing influence of the multipurpose doctrine of New Public Management (Hood,
1991). As successive strata of administrative reforms were laid down in Western countries from
the 1980s, the NPM doctrine has played a major role, by criticizing inherited administrative
structures and rules and offering new ways of organizing administrative systems. It borrows
in heterogeneous fashion from economics, management theory and private-sector management
practices (Pollitt, 1990; Merrien, 1999) but also picks up solutions from early reform experiments
launched in “Anglo-Saxon” countries and from recommandations by transnational organizations
such as the OECD or the World Bank (Sahlin-Andersson, 2002). “New Public Management”
stands particularly for four new organizational principles, which are frequently found in differing
combinations in Western states but together may be labelled “the steering state”1:
• separating and differentiating the strategic functions of decision-making, design and steering
– as well as monitoring or evaluating public policies – from the functions, usually referred
to as “administrative”, that involve responsibility for implementation, “simple” execution or
actually meeting the cost of public policies;
1 This label (in French État-Stratège) was used for the first time in 1993 (CGP, 1993).
• splitting big vertical bureaucracies by decentralizing, devolving or delegating administrative
tasks to the lowest levels of management in small autonomous administrative units in charge
of specialized “public policies” (possibly using the form of the agency);
• strengthening the hierarchical role of managers in central or devolved government administra-
tion, making them “real bosses” responsible for their ministry’s specific public policies;
• rationalizing relations between central administrations and devolved services, with contracts
defining the objectives to be pursued by the services, the resources granted and the methods
for measurement and systematic evaluation of results and with an overall budget (including a
personnel budget) and increased autonomy.
As Herman Schwartz (1994), Patrick Dunleavy (1997) and Oliver James (2001) have observed,
NPM-inspired reforms have indeed redesigned the state organizational form in many countries
(Great Britain, Sweden, New Zealand) and seeming to take up several elements of the multidivi-
sional “M” form of big private firms, promoting small-sized administrative units that are focused
on a single task and are managed more coherently and directly. In France, since the early 1990s,
many elements suggest that large-scale reorganization work has been initiated revisiting relations
between central administrations and local units of the state and that this has been considera-
bly accelerated by the current implementation of the Budget reform. Of course, this redesign of
French bureaucracy is not taking place in an institutional vacuum. Reformers are “embedded”
in the legacies of administrative systems: their resources and attitudes towards change are partly
patterned within inherited, structuring institutional arrangements – and these institutional arran-
gements cannot be reversed without high costs because of the existence of constituencies that
are likely to veto any proposal that is going to threaten their autonomy and survival (see Pierson,
2004).
This article provides an empirical analysis2 of how new organizational principles for the French
bureaucracy were imported, reworked, negotiated and slowly implemented throughout the 1990s.
After describing the new form of administrative organisation, as revealed by several official texts
(Section 1), we shall go on to show that its adoption relied on two parallel processes, mutually
influential but clearly distinct. On the one hand, concrete reorganization resulted, first of all, from
power struggles internal to the state, which set in opposition three major actors (the Ministries
of the Interior, the Budget and the Civil Service) who occupied the central positions of control
of the whole state but were competing to draw up and claim new forms of hierarchy and control
(Section 2). On the other hand, the concrete reorganization measures introduced by these three
major actors were not a line-for-line copy of the organizational model defended in official reports
of the 1990s. In seeking to understand where this paradigmatic model came from, we shall
demonstrate that it derived from a parallel dynamic: some of France’s most senior civil servants,
coming from the grands corps de l’État and free from any ministerial affiliation, have imported
2 Empirically, this article draws on research, conducted from 1995 onwards, for a thesis in political science (Bezes,
2002a), proposing a historical sociology of administrative reform policies in France from the 1960s to the 1990s. It
also draws on analysis of changes that have taken place since 2000. The study relied on a combination of different
methods. Firstly, at the centre lays an in-depth study of the activities of two major reform mechanisms – the Task Force
on Organization of the State, known as the Picq Task Force (1993–1994) and the State Reform Commission (the CRE,
1995–1998) – based on numerous interviews and confidential internal documents consulted at the CRE during the Summer
of 1998. Secondly, it made use of interviews with senior civil servants from the Budget Directorate and the Ministry for
the Civil Service and State Reform, as well as a systematic scrutiny of a large body of grey literature developed by the
ministries. Finally, it mobilized the literature of comparative analyses relating to administrative reform policies to New
Public Management and – for France in particular – to decentralization, devolution policy and financial reforms.
an overall reorganization scheme by borrowing widespread NPM ideas that they view as helpful
for the issues at stake in the French administration and useful for the specific problems they
face as top French civil servants (Section 3). In conclusion (Section 4), we shall draw theoretical
lessons from the two dynamics identified: we argue that they correspond not only to two facets
of the organizational form – cognitive category and power redistribution scheme – but also to the
divisions of labour characteristic of a state.
1. The emergence of a new paradigm of state organization in the French context: the
“steering state”, with variations on that theme
Our first task was to identify the emergence and recurrence of new principles of reorganization,
by examining a body of official documents for the period 1991–2001. In their most accessible and
public form, these principles for state organization are revealed primarily through a small number
of generic “grey literature” texts (public or confidential reports from reform committees and a
general purpose circular), which were simultaneously “prescriptive” and “strategic”. We took five
texts that resulted from the work of different “state reform committees” set up in the 1990s:
• the Report of the Commission on State Efficiency for the 10th Plan (1989–92), chaired by the
journalist, Franc¸ois de Closets (1989);
• a think-tank report on ‘The state, administration and public services in the year 2000’, chaired
by Christian Blanc (1992), operating in the context of preparatory work for the 11th Plan (CGP,
1993);
• the Report of the Task Force on the Responsibilities and Organization of the State (1993–1994),
with Jean Picq, Senior Counsellor of the Court of State Auditors, appointed as Chairman by
Prime Minister Édouard Balladur (MROE, 1995);
• the Prime Minister’s Circular of 26 July 1995 on the preparation and implementation of reform
of the state and public services3;
• the voluminous confidential report of the State Reform Commission (the CRE), a body created
in September 1995 to run a vast three-years programme of planning for overall reform of
administration (CRE, 1995).
In a clear break with programmes for “modernization of administration” (Bezes, 2002a) and
for “public service renewal” (Chaty, 1997), the theories of the 1990s were marked by a concern to
rethink the whole architecture of the state, not limiting reform just to simple, locally-introduced
experiments. In outline, the new way of thinking about reshaping the state was based on continued
reaffirmation (in different forms) of the centrality of dual functionality. This reaffirmed the “art of
separation” (Du Gay, 1994) between “policy” and “administration” – despite Herbert A. Simon’s
denunciation of its illusory nature (Simon, 1947).
The leitmotiv of the new organizational form was the concern to separate and differentiate the
strategic functions of decision-making, design and steering – as well as monitoring or evaluating
public policies – from the functions, usually referred to as “administrative”, that involve respon-
sibility for implementation, “simple” execution or actually meeting the cost of public policies.
As early as 1989, the Closets Report was explicitly signalling the need to “recentre the state”:
“less direct management, less production of norms, less finicky definition of policy methods
3 Official Journal of 28 July 1995, pp. 11217–11219. We will refer to this Circular using the label “Juppé”.
imposed on operational services: central administration must change role. Its task will be above
all to define objectives and policy principles, to advise the external services and promote net-
working, to help them by providing them with expertise, training and information, to check that
their activities are going in the right direction and are in line with the principle of unity of public
policy” (Closets, 1989, pp. 166–7). The Blanc and Picq Reports converged with this thinking,
defending as necessary the reshaping of central administrations into “strategic leadership direc-
torates” (MROE, 1995, p. 83) centred on a “policy design role” (MROE, 1995, p. 127), with
staff reductions and redeployments towards devolved services. The Juppé Circular took up the
same themes, stressing the need to differentiate the “functions of regulation” (forecasting, ana-
lysis, design, legislation and evaluation) from the role of operator, which consists of “managing,
applying bodies of regulations or providing benefits”. The State Reform Commission legitimized
the logics of delegating administrative tasks to the lowest possible levels of management, whether
devolved (to local units of the state), decentralized (to local authorities) or externalized (through
privatization or contractualization) (CRE, 1995).
Establishing separation between two areas of functions is central, but it has several corollaries.
Firstly, it goes hand in hand with the requirement – reaffirmed everywhere – for stronger state
capacities for steering, forecasting, coordination and monitoring. Thus, these documents made
demands for:
• “development of the strategic knowledge function in administration” and “renewal, through
training and recruitment, of public-sector decision makers”, in order to achieve greater specia-
lization in the public policy issues at stake (CGP, 1993, p. 95);
• “giving government the means to direct the state” and “restoring the state’s decision-making
capacity” (MROE, 1995, p. 110);
• “improving central administrations” capacities for design and decision-making (Juppé, 1995);
• dedicating a single area of reform to the need for stronger capacities in developing and evaluating
public policies (CRE, 1995, Reform no.10).
In the language of the firm, these recommendations formalize the concern to reshape the
hierarchy not only through differentiating a clearly identified tier of supervisory staff but also
through reforming the skills and competencies required to reach these positions. Reform of the
state’s higher supervisory staffing is thus presented as an indispensable additional reform. The
hierarchical role of directors in central government administration should be strengthened: they
should be “given their due authority”, as a counterweight to the influence of ministers’ private
offices (MROE, 1995, pp. 118–119), making them ‘real bosses’, responsible for their ministry’s
specific public policies (MROE, 1995, p. 121).4 Indeed, the ministerial private offices should be
considerably smaller.
The second corollary of dual functionality was the contractualization of relations between
central administrations and devolved services. This represented a “solution” – at least within the
framework of a new formal architecture – to the problem of “agency” posed by the separation
of a devolved service and the autonomy granted to it. Contracts defining the objectives to be
pursued by the services, the resources granted and the methods for measurement and systematic
4 The posts concerned number about a thousand: they are “strategic jobs”, comprising 200 management posts in central
government administration and public corporations, about 100 senior magistrates’ posts and 500 to 600 préfets and
directors of the main local units of the state.
evaluation of results were the management instrument most frequently advocated in the various
committees’ reports (Closets, 1989, p. 168; CGP, 1993, p. 74; MROE, 1995, p. 135). In the
Juppé Circular, contractualization was presented as the management principle that would enable
“among other things, definition of the objectives assigned to operational services, of the room for
manœuvre guaranteed to them in negotiating an overall budget (including a personnel budget),
of the methods for evaluating their costs and results and of the conditions in which services
and officials may benefit from a share in productivity gains”. This borrows directly from the
reorganizations of large firms: “these observations underline the very strong contrast between the
way the state functions in France and the way other big organizations are run. Businesses in France
and throughout the world have long since reviewed the relationships between their head office
and their operational services, creating cost and profit centres and giving responsibility to local
“bosses”. Similarly, in other countries – notably “Anglo-Saxon” ones – the state has long since
given its operational services autonomy and responsibility” (CRE, 1995, Reform no. 21). Taken
as a whole, this convergent paradigm updated the bases on which government activity was to be
rationalized and hierarchy to be transformed – using contractualization. From then on, the focus
would be on measuring and monitoring the effectiveness, efficiency and efficacy of administrative
activities and of public servants.
The various documents reveal a homogeneous model of organization that revisits, with a
French flavour, certain dominant traits of New Public Management and of the reforms conducted
in other European countries (Pollitt and Boukaert, 2004). However, two important elements are
less systematically emphasized in the French case. The first is the specialization of administrative
services into units organized around “public policies”, on the model of organization by product.
The idea of differentiating the organization into autonomous administrative units (or using agen-
cies) was advocated – though euphemistically. The Blanc Report proposes cautious use of this
approach in cases where “functional logic” should override “territorial logic” (CGP, 1993, p.
87), while the Picq Report pleads for the transformation of public establishments and adminis-
trations into agencies, in cases where they provide services ‘that do not involve discretionary
assessment, but follow objective criteria’. Secondly, there is little evidence of the separation of
“administration” from “the political”. It can be found in the Blanc Report and the Picq Report:
both suggest reducing the politial influence of ministerial private offices, which are too much
involved in administrative issues, by downsizing their staffs in order to repoliticize ministers’
advisers and to reinforce the authority of senior civil servants in central administrations. Howe-
ver, there is little mention of these claims in the texts that emanate from permanent bodies, such
as the Juppé Circular or the preliminary outline of the State Reform Commission’s three-years
plan.
Written in the 1990s, these reports were first and foremost reform programmes; yet they
also represented new, legitimized ways of thinking about the administrative state. Some of them
resulted from a strategy to build a consensus on the reforms to be adopted next (CGP, 1993; MROE,
1995), while others were linked to ongoing reform initiatives (Juppé, 1995; CRE, 1995). In both
cases, it is important to analyse these documents in relation to the reforms actually implemented
in France in the 1990s. Did these reorganization principles, at the heart of the 1990s reforms, aim
to introduce a new distribution of power between hierarchical levels? If not, to what other issues
and groups did this new “image of the state” refer? In order to answer this question, our analysis
first focuses on games that collective administrative actors (ministries, departments, groups) play
inside the state apparatus when participating in the structuring and negotiation of reorganization
reforms. We shall then stress the institutional arrangements and power struggles peculiar to the
French institutional map, in order to enquire into the complex historical process that has shaped
the new organizational form. Other “external actors” (politicians, local representatives, experts in
New Public Management, media) were part of the process, but their strategies will not be analysed
here (for a broader view, see Bezes, 2002a; for an analysis of French politicians’ dilemmas on
administrative reforms, see Bezes, 2001).
2. The institutional constraints on separating steering functions from operational
functions in the French context: competition between the Ministries of the Interior, the
Budget and the Civil Service
Studying the possible, effective uses of new organizational principles presented in public
reports requires an understanding of how some of the collective actors who occupy cen-
tral positions in the administrative system have appropriated such principles in the face of
changes in their environments. In the French case, three major institutional actors – the Gene-
ral Directorate of Administration of the Ministry of the Interior, the Budget Directorate of
the Ministry of Finance and the General Directorate for Administration and the Civil Ser-
vice (within the Ministry for the Civil Service and State Reform) – have played an essential
role in developing principles and instruments of coordination and integration for the state
as a whole. Section 2, therefore, aims to reconstruct the strategies and rationales of these
three major ministerial actors, who are in charge of the major transverse rules for the whole
administrative system and who, during the 1990s, developed, defended or mobilized new reor-
ganization principles – in a context marked by the transformation of their environment and
resources.
2.1. The paradigm for reorganization according to the Ministry of the Interior: remedy
decentralization through horizontal devolution
In the early 1990s, the Ministry of the Interior and, notably, its General Directorate of Adminis-
tration undertook a programme of administrative reorganization that introduced a primary logic
of differentiation within the state. The decentralization legislation of 1982–1984 had strengthened
the power of local authorities in public policies, by easing controls that had weighed heavily on
them and by extending their field of activities through transfers of powers. In doing this, the legis-
lation had also served to emphasize interdependencies between the state and local authorities and
had led to the clear diagnosis, in the late 1980s, of a new problem in coordinating and organizing
state regional policy (Costa and Jegouzo, 1988). On the one hand, decentralization weakened the
position of the sectoral ministries and of their external services (for case analyses, see Costa and
Jegouzo, 1988; Duran and Hérault, 1992; Grémion, 1992) and led to “compromise” and “bar-
gaining” with local elected officials, whose position became fully legitimized (Le Lidec, 2001).
On the other hand, it entailed redefinition of the Ministry of the Interior’s policy system. From
then on, local authorities increasingly formed relationships with the “sectoral ministries” and no
longer maintained a quasi-exclusive relationship with the Ministry of the Interior, which thus
saw its power challenged. The vertical, national logics of the sectoral ministries also conflicted
with the horizontal, territorial logics of the préfets (centrally-appointed officials representing the
state, in charge of coordinating state field services and relationships with local authorities), whose
powers were challenged. “Each ministry finds means to preserve the autonomy of its services
in relation to interministerial coordination” (Bernard, 1988; Bernard, 1992). The journal of the
corps préfectoral and senior civil servants at the Ministry of the Interior, entitled Administration,
repeatedly echoed the problems of coordination identified in the second half of the 1980s.5 In his
Circular of 5 December 1986, the prime minister, Jacques Chirac, called the sectoral ministries
to order, accusing them of “frequently encroaching on the exclusive responsibility of the préfet
in the dissemination and implementation of (their) instructions”.
Faced with the weakening of their capacities for coordination and their control over state regio-
nal policy, the préfets and the Ministry of the Interior’s General Directorate of Administration
defended a reaffirmation of the préfets’ powers. Put succinctly, the strategy of the corps préfectoral
was to gain over local units of the state the authority it had lost over local representative officials.
This was all the more likely to be accepted because it also related to the concern to rationalize
local units of the state in the face of local authorities. The organizational model was imposed
gradually. As early as 1983, reorganization of state’s external services and their separation from
central administration had been presented as necessary adjuncts to decentralization, but had never
been made the object of any concrete measure. From 1984 to 1986, Pierre Joxe, minister of the
Interior, sought to increase the space in which préfets could act in the face of local representatives
(it was decided to make the budgets of prefectures part of the state budget). However, it was only
from 1989 onwards, with the lengthy negotiations around the ATR Act (the Law of 6 February
1992 on territorial administration of the republic), that the Ministry of the Interior, under the lea-
dership of the new Minister, Philippe Marchand, initiated a scoping reform to reorganize external
services (described in the Act as “devolved services”). The ATR Act and the Devolution Charter
that accompanied it6 carried forward a strong reorganizing vision. They set out the principle of
subsidiarity for central administrations, confirming that the execution of public policies was the
exclusive preserve of the préfet and the devolved authorities.7 They provided that central admi-
nistrations now had only subject-matter jurisdiction, corresponding to “tasks that are national in
nature or whose execution, under the law, cannot be delegated to a territorial level”. Article 2 of
the Decree explicitly indicates that “central administration fulfils, at the national level, roles of
design, pace-setting, orientation, evaluation and monitoring”. Its spheres are specific: defining
and financing national policies, monitoring their application and evaluating their effects; general
organization of state services and laying down the rules to be applied.8
The lengthy negotiations on this legislation began in Summer 1988 and involved two Directo-
rates of the Ministry of the Interior (the General Directorate for Local Authorities and the General
Directorate of Administration) and representatives of the préfets, ministries and associations of
elected officials. From these negotiations, devolution emerged as an ideal tool and the principle of
devolution was confirmed by Charter as providing a rule for the distribution of competencies and
resources between the different levels of state civil administration. Strategically, the devolution
instrument functioned in two timescales. It first affirmed the necessary autonomy of local units
of the state in relation to central administrations; it then placed them back under the leadership of
the préfet, whose powers of coordination were strengthened.
5 See, for example, the special issue devoted to the state and to decentralization (No. 134, December 1986) and the
numerous “opinion columns” that appeared over the period, in which préfets criticized the uncertainties of decentralization
and its stumbling-blocks (No. 134, December 1986; No. 138, January 1988).
6 Decree No. 92-604 of 1st July 1992 to institute the Devolution Charter.
7 An interministerial committee for territorial administration (CIATER) was charged with following up the application of
these principles, while a committee for admininstrative reorganization and devolution (CRDA), under the Prime Minister,
took on the role of enforcing proposals and incentivizing.
8 Decree No. 92-604 of 1st July 1992 to institute the Devolution Charter, Official Journal of 4 July 1992, p. 8899.
The ATR Act and its Devolution Charter lay at the origin of a two-pronged movement for admi-
nistrative reorganization that focused, firstly, on “plans to reorganize ministries” and, secondly,
on “plans to reorganize devolved services”. After 1992, there was a proliferation of such plans;
these generated bargaining processes at many levels, promoting exchanges of favours, low-profile
acquisition of institutional protection and lowest-common-denominator solutions. From the first
outline plans to reorganize ministries, required after 1992, to the more recent “state plans for the
départements” (called for by the Interministerial Committee on State Reform on 13 July 1999)
and “state plans for the regions” (Decree of 24 April 2001), the procedures are identical. They
express the desire to see focal points of action emerge, with responsibility clearly organized in a
configuration that will, in actual fact, see the various vertical ministries, the devolved services, the
préfets and the local authorities continuing to compete in the production of public policies. Up to
now, as a recent report from the Court of State Auditors indicates, the reorganization/reduction of
central administrations, the setting-up of a steering structure for devolved services and the creation
of focal areas “have been unequally and insufficiently implemented and have not been assessed”
(Cour des Comptes, 2003). Similarly, “central administrations have not yet been provided with
the design staff or the steering structures needed for their new tasks” (Cour des Comptes, 2003,
p. 154). At the end of nearly twelve years of infinitely repetitive negotiations, an outline plan for
reorganizing territorial administration of the state has only just been adopted. It creates eight focal
subject-areas in the regions: a simple list of these is enough to illustrate the importance of their
transactions, since they essentially cover the vertical devolved directorates.9
From this first analysis, therefore, we can conclude that, in the 1990s, the Ministry of the Interior
carried forward a new form of organization, promoting the separation of central government
administration from local units of the state. However, the design that it carried through was
centred on the territory and on horizontal relations, as distinct from the vertical form advocated
by New Public Management theory – and from the recommendations typically put forward in
reports of the same period.
2.2. The General Directorate for Administration and the Civil Service (the DGAFP): a
mimetic importer of New Public Management principles
Historically, since its creation in 1945, the DGAFP has been in charge, in conjunction with the
Budget Directorate, of recruitment coordination, the Civil Service Act and Regulations, career
structures and pay matters relating to state personnel; it is also responsible for following up pro-
blems (notably legal ones) relating to these topics. As a quasi-legal expert, it is also the privileged
interlocutor of the trade unions, notably in the context of wage bargaining structures established in
the early 1970s. Traditionally, the DGAFP is a directorate with limited powers: unlike the Budget
Directorate or the Ministry of the Interior’s General Directorate of Administration, the DGAFP
does not have any strategic resources (financial means; the legal status of préfets). Any effective
action that it could take on the rules of the French Civil Service, for example, is constrained both
by budgetary controls and by the autonomy that the corps (groupings of officials with the same
conditions of service, each of which has its own particular methods of internal management and
9 The eight focal areas finally adopted were: education and training; public sector management and economic develop-
ment; transport; housing and planning; public health and social cohesion; the agricultural economy and the rural fabric;
employment development and workforce integration; culture. The regional directorates for youth and sport, the prison
services and youth protection services were kept separate from the focal areas. (Decree No. 2004-1053 of 5 October 2004
and circular of 19 October 2004 on reform of the territorial administration of the state.).
promotion) enjoy in personnel management. At this time, the DGAFP was the first to champion
the idea of “contracts” between central administrations and devolved state services. The origin of
this commitment to reform lay in the decision of Prime Minister Michel Rocard’s private office to
entrust the DGAFP with the task of following up the “public service renewal” policy launched in
1989 (Chaty, 1997; Bezes, 2002a). By the early 1990s, the DGAFP was institutionalized in this
role of coordinating administrative reform and was put in charge of the first experimental “res-
ponsibility centres” – the first management contracts between administrative levels in the French
administration. The transformation of administrative services into “responsibility centres” took
place on a voluntary basis and relied on a new kind of transaction: in exchange for greater manage-
ment flexibility (replacing a priori control with a posteriori control; favouring annual reporting of
appropriations in order to enable some fluidity in management; pooling operating appropriations,
etc.), services had to make explicit statements of their objectives, resources and expected results
and had to undertake to set up a system of management controls, internal at the centre and external
with a system of periodic information returns. In negotiating the reform (Circular of 25 January
1990), the DGAFP enhanced the autonomy and freedom of service managers and simplified its
forms of control. It is no surprise, therefore, that it came up against the Budget Directorate, which
feared the expensive effects of these lighter controls and argued for another formula (Chaty, 1997).
From the early 1990s, the DGAFP began to adopt a strategy adapted to its position within the
state. Its strategy was based on the importation and dissemination of NPM ideas on reorganization
that would help it to reinforce its expertise and strengthen its legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell,
1983). The DGAFP was all the more in favour of developing contracts and reinforcing mana-
gers’ autonomy within the French administration because the financial effects of these measures
would be primarily the concern of the Budget Directorate. Significantly, throughout the 1990s, the
DGAFP activated many networks. Especially worthy of mention are “managers’ clubs”, where
the DGAFP joined up with managers from ministries in charge of training or of human resources
management and its participation on behalf of France in European networks of senior civil servants
from national administrations, in charge of civil service personnel management policies, which
were coordinated by the European Institute of Public Administration at Maastricht. In the same
perspective, the very experienced Director of the DGAFP, Bernard Pêcheur,10 in post from 1989
to 1994, chaired the OECD’s Public Management Service (PUMA11), which brought together
senior civil servants in charge of administrative reform issues in various countries. The working
groups in which senior civil servants from the DGAFP took part tended to favour learning from
foreign experience (for example, from the countries of Northern Europe) and mechanisms for
importing and translating New Public Management ideas that were judged to be legitimate in the
French context (Sahlin-Andersson, 2000; Bezes, 2005).
On the other hand, the DGAFP was cautious on the subject of devolved personnel manage-
ment, which related to one of its areas of competence – civil service law – and was a sensitive
subject. Devolved human resources management represented another variation of the steering
state model. It consisted of replacing the national centralized framework for decision-making on
10 A graduate of ENA (1974–1976), administrateur civil then a bureau head at the Budget Directorate (1976–1981),
Bernard Pêcheur was technical adviser to the private office of Laurent Fabius, the Budget Minister, and then Deputy
Director of the minister’s private office when Fabius became minister for Industry and Research. From 1984 onwards,
Pêcheur was adviser on the civil service to the new prime minister, Fabius. Appointed a reporting member of the Conseil
d’État (1985), he was industrial relations adviser to the Office of the President of France from 1988 to 1989, where he
played a major role in public service strike negotiations.
11 On PUMA, see Sahlin-Andersson, 2000.
the recruitment and career progression of public servants with a decentralized system in which
the directors of local units of the state enjoyed a great deal of autonomy in managing their staff.
On this point, the DGAFP took a particularly measured approach. Firstly, it found itself face-to-
face with numerous legal complexities related to the Civil Service Act and Regulations and the
jurisprudence of the Conseil d’État, as well as with the corps-based organization of the French
civil service. Above all, it had to take into account resistance from a large number of the actors
with whom it negotiates. While the personnel directorates of central administrations were reluc-
tant to lose control of their employees, heads of devolved services did not necessarily seem to
favor a measure that presupposed their having to manage sometimes embarrassing issues of staff
appraisal and promotion. At the same time, civil service trade union organizations were hostile
to a measure that they regarded as intended to subdue and fragment the national bargaining fra-
mework. In denouncing the measure as a challenge to equal treatment, the trade unions were
also aware of the reconfigurations of organizational capacities that it demanded and of the risk
of loss of power at the centre that it entailed for them. As privileged interlocutor of these groups
and guarantor of the Civil Service Act and Regulations, the DGAFP therefore remained cautious
in its proposals to devolve personnel management activities. In this regard, moreover, the new
provisions of the LOLF were bound to be worrying, since they favored more decentralized, more
flexible management of staff, within the framework of “programmes” that corresponded to public
policies. In opposition to the Budget Directorate therefore, the DGAFP hesitated to decentralize
the joint administrative committees where people’s careers were discussed. It defended the prin-
ciple of interministerial management of staff at the local level, which was dominated not just by
budgetary considerations. As it had at the time of the negotiations on the ATR Act and then during
the various rounds of negotiations on reorganization of devolved services between 1992 and 2004,
the DGAFP formed an alliance with the Ministry of the Interior and “played on” the strengthening
of the préfets’ role and horizontal devolution. By supporting local reorganizations of devolved
services around a strengthened préfet and by defending “interministeriality”, it was able to oppose
the more threatening vertical devolution that the Budget Directorate was advocating.
2.3. The view of reorganization from the Budget Directorate: better control over spending
operations through rethinking the hierarchies
In defending a third strategy, the Budget Directorate was also to become, throughout the 1990s,
an actor engaged in the processes of administrative reform. Like the Ministry of the Interior,
the Budget Directorate was first of all confronted with a transformation in its environment: it
was forced to interpret this and then react to it. In this case, it had to face a new financial
decline in public accounts, as the economic situation of 1991–1993 was marked by the strongest
recession since the War. The deepening deficit of public administrations12 was matched by the
state’s worsening budgetary deficit, which went from 122.4 billion francs in 1991 to 234.6 billion
in 1992 (an increase of nearly 91%), soaring to 364 billion francs in 1994. An added worry
was the growth in debt, caused by the very high level of real interest rates, risking a spiral of
self-sustained debt arising solely from growing interest charges (the “snowball effect”13). From
12 The public administration deficit (the funding needs of public administrations, the state, local authorities and social
security) in fact went from 101,089 million francs in 1990 to 147,078 million in 1991 (2% of GDP), then to 430.7 million
francs in 1993 (5.9% of GDP), remaining at 403.8 million in 1995 (5% of GDP).
13 The “snowball effect” occurs when the interest rate on debt is higher than the growth rate of GDP, which leads to an
exponential increase in the debt/GDP ratio (Siné, 2006).
1992 onwards, the concerns linked to deteriorating public finances (deficits and debts) became
particularly acute for two reasons. Firstly, these declines were an intrinsic part of a new normative
context linked to the Maastricht Treaty of 7 February 1992 (and the negotiations that preceded
it), establishing the process that should lead to European monetary union. The European Treaty,
through article 104C of the Maastricht Treaty, imposed new budgetary policy norms: the famous
convergence criteria, limiting budget deficits to 3% of GDP and debt to 60% of the same GDP.
The European Commission and France’s European partners thus appeared to be “standard-setting
entrepreneurs” (Siné, 2006), limiting national powers over budgeting and conferring a “new
externality on budgetary policies” (Artus, 1996, p. 53). Secondly, the strong growth in deficits
and debt was an intrinsic feature of the context created by the emergence of an economy of
financial markets (Siné, 2006). This entailed a change in the structure of France’s debt, which
moved from a non-negotiable debt to a negotiable one, made up of bonds and securities issued on
the financial markets. It also gave “markets” the capacities to sanction governments on the basis
of indicators (deficit, debt) that would now function as signals revealing government choices on
public finances.
These elements, relating to both the immediate and the structural economic situations, affected
budgetary policy and, in the early 1990s, modified the Budget Directorate’s traditional strategy for
regulating appropriations and budgetary management practices. Traditional means of exercising
budgetary policy (freezes, centralized budgetary regulation of ministries, automatic and low-
profile cutbacks), used extensively in the 1980s, appeared to have insufficient effects in the face
of the new financial situation, the “rigidity” of public spending14 and the structural erosion of
room for manoeuvre. Between 1990 and 1995, senior civil servants in the Budget Directorate
started to consider other ways of doing things in two particular spheres.
On the one hand, the Budget Directorate’s central control over the spending ministries again
became a crucial issue, as did correspondences, in operating the budget, between the objectives
fixed during budget negotiations, the resources voted by Parliament and the sums actually com-
mitted by the ministries in the course of the year. The new imperative of control required, first
of all, centrally available, subtler, more homogeneous information about the costs of the public
policies conducted by ministries and about their operating and staffing expenditures. This created
a need to set up more reliable information systems, based on – among other things – management
control. Instruments for controlling public finances evolved, moving from a strategy of reducing
public expenditures ex ante to a logic of “control at a distance”, which was strongly procedural
and centred on the development of indicators that enabled expenditures, activities and results to
be tracked.
On the other hand, this desire to regulate spending presupposed greater reliance than before on
the sectoral ministries, in so far as they alone were able to produce the required information on their
activities, even in a standardized form. The requirement for monitoring was therefore accompanied
by a simultaneous prescription to strengthen the autonomy of managers and their responsibilities
for the expenditures they incurred. In planning to concede more autonomy to managers of devolved
services, the Budget Directorate saw the possibility of transferring unpopular arbitration decisions
to reduce expenditure – notably employment-related expenditure – to the local level.
However, it was by no means the case that this “model of control through the production and
processing of information” (Ogien, 1995, p. 67), linked to an approach involving contractual
14 There is an ever-increasing part of the state’s public expenditures that cannot be restricted, because it has to be renewed
from one year to the next; its growth is due notably to personnel expenditure, interest charges on debt and operational
expenditure.
relationships with administrative services, emerged without any kind of resistance or constraint
within the Budget Directorate. It was in this context that, throughout the 1990s, knowledge about
public management began to arouse the interest of a growing number of senior civil servants in
the Budget Directorate – initially in the small Bureau 1-B of the First Vice-directorate, created
in 1986 and given responsibility for new management methods. Although this Bureau was weak,
often “poorly thought-of” and sometimes accused – within the Directorate – of being “too close
to spending ministers” (interview with a member of Bureau 1-B), its members played a major
role as importers of ideas and instruments close to New Public Management, which they recycled
and disseminated through close contacts with PUMA, the OECD’s Public Management Service
and with consultancies, as well as with the sectoral ministries themselves. Supported by the
“reformers” (Bureau 1-B; managers), the principles of specialization of services around identified
objectives, managers’ autonomy, “internal contractualization” and the development of standards
for control over management gradually became issues for debate within the Budget Directorate.
These debates were all the more lively because not all budget officials shared this vision of a
more positive role for the Directorate. The budget officials running the Directorate were much
more stubborn in regard to instruments which, they feared, were weakening their capacities for
spending control.
Throughout the 1990s, therefore, by virtue of the expertise of Bureau 1-B and of initiatives
from the Budget Directorate management team, the principles of internal contractualization were
cautiously translated into the form of technical instruments and introduced at the margin of bud-
getary operations. Developed incrementally, these “micromeasures” (Abate, 2000) nevertheless
carried forward real changes in ways of thinking about and regulating relations between central
administrations and devolved services. Significantly, they were all to be taken up again and sys-
tematized within the framework of the LOLF (the major reform of budgetary procedure of 1st
August 2001).
The first tool is that of the “aggregated heading”. It consists of pooling budget appropriations
under a single, broad, aggregated heading (instead of having a large number of separate budgets)
and (supposedly) giving managers in ministries a great deal of latitude in how they (re)allocate
appropriations within this frame in the form of “fungible budget allocations”. Between 1990
and 1996, the Budget Directorate gradually moved towards pooling day-to-day operating items
for all the ministries (though excluding personnel appropriations) in order to allow managers to
“reallocate their operating resources according to their priorities and their capacities to control
the different spending centres”. The incremental use of this tool nicely illustrates the changing
relationships between central administrations and local units of the state: managers’ “budget
maximizing” behaviours were challenged by giving them greater freedom in the use of appro-
priations within an overall sum (allocated but capped), yet also transferring to them responsibility
for arbitration decisions and requiring them to deploy management tools to track the operation of
the total running grant and compare the costs of services.
The second tool, launched in 1997, is a new experimental form of contracting between central
administrations, local units of the state and the Budget Directorate. The “service contracts” expe-
riment, a new model developed by the Budget Directorate15 for managing local units of the state,
was a strategy that strengthened the autonomy of managers in the context of budgets that increa-
singly had to be treated as both aggregated and fungible; yet it also encouraged them, locally, to
15 Although the circular (12 July 1996, No 1-B 96-337) dealt with state reform as well as the budget, in fact the Budget
Directorate monopolized production of this text.
make choices to reduce personnel expenditure and to introduce more restrictive reporting tools.
Through the creation of an “overall service budget” that brought together the whole operating
grant, temporary staffing appropriations and personnel appropriations, a manager was encouraged
to arbitrate between the different categories of resources, notably by recycling savings made on
staffing costs into an additional operating budget, even though it was forbidden to “propose net
job creations beyond the allocation of jobs communicated by the central administration”.16 These
“flexibilities”, adopted in order to encourage personnel spending reductions at the local level, were
also accompanied by stronger expectations in regard to monitoring tools for cost management, ins-
truments for measuring service efficiency (comparison ratios, etc.) and forecasting management
for jobs and staffing level. Set up experimentally, the service contracts approach initially failed
because the sectoral ministries refused to adopt voluntarily management tools that were so visibly
intended to make them shoulder responsibility for a policy of staffing restrictions. Even after the
Interministerial Committee for State Reform decided, on 12 October 2001, to confirm a new expe-
riment, implementation of the “contracting” approach – accompanied by aggregation of resources
– remained very uneven across the various ministries, according to a recent assessment by the
Court of State Auditors (Cour des Comptes, 2003). Nevertheless, although the overall contracting
approach was not applied systematically, various of its elements continued to be strategically impo-
sed by the Budget Directorate as low-profile measures or, in contrast, in the context of the major
reform represented by the new Institutional Act on Finance Legislation (the LOLF), adopted on
1st August 2001. In fact, its strong influence over negotiations for this finance legislation allowed
the Budget Directorate to acquire a new instrument that helped to contractualize relationships and
to encourage deletion of posts, leading to a reduction in personnel expenditure. The LOLF put the
finishing touches to the dynamic of aggregation of appropriations, begun in the 1990s, by merging
previously specialized budget headings within a “programme” that defined a functional objective
(a public policy) and not the economic nature of appropriations (investment, operating, etc.).
Transforming the principle of specialization in this way leaves greater freedom for the manager in
the use of different resources within the framework of the programme (the principle of fungibility).
However, there were two very strong constraints: personnel expenditure increases were forbidden
(leading to asymmetric fungibility)17 and there was a proliferation of devices underpinning the
obligation for “accountability” (cost measurements, ratios to compare services, etc.).
The third instrument illustrates how the Budget Directorate has also developed measures aimed
at strengthening means of control over spending at the territorial level. Thus, reforming devolved
financial control (experimentally from 1995 and, following the Decree of 16 July 1996, generally)
has also been an intrinsic element in recasting hierarchical relations between the Ministry of
Finance and the sectoral ministries. The Directorate set up new regional focal centres for financial
control of state activities at the devolved level, run by regional Paymasters-General, each of
whom has in his office a senior civil servant from the Ministry of Finance, in charge of devolved
financial control. Again, the strategic aims of the reform are important. On the one hand, the
Budget Directorate has affirmed stronger “managerial autonomy” for managers, allowing the new
devolved financial controller to adjust controls, using examination of the services’ budgets and
accounts to monitor management efficiency (rather than constantly trying to control irregularities).
However, use of this possibility is at the discretion of the financial controller and depends on
the intensity and quality of the management monitoring tools that have been developed within
16 Circular of 12 July 1996, No 1-B 96-337, on the implementation of an experimental approach to service contracts.
17 A wage bill ceiling and a jobs ceiling were also to be defined for each programme and for each Ministry.
the service that has the power to authorize expenditure. Nevertheless, it means that the Budget
Directorate has set up a strategy for local monitoring that will promote, gradually and in the long
run, the development of a system arising from local information and allowing better tracking
of operational spending conditions. Therefore, although it possesses neither devolved services
nor networks of correspondents, the Budget Directorate is equipped with a network for financial
control at the local level, reliant on the Public Revenue Department but steered through a unit
attached to the Directorate’s First Vice-Directorate. In this strategy, the logic of spending control
overrides the managerial logics of separation. Anticipating the still limited extension of devolved
recruitment activities and personnel management (a feature mainly of the “big ministries” like
National Education, the Interior or Infrastructure), the Budget Directorate has created – through
reform – devolved financial control, centred on employment: in particular, it requires individual
(rather than overall), advance (not a posteriori) authorization by the controller to allow “entry
flows” into the civil service (Pain, 1996).
These three instruments, set up on the periphery in the 1990s, contain the bases of a system
of “performance management” that leads those responsible for services – in return for budgetary
autonomy – to focus on the objectives and results to be achieved, which in turn form the object of a
system of measurement through indicators. Traditional tools of NPM (O.C.D.E., 1995), the three
instruments have all been taken up again and systematized within the LOLF framework, thus insti-
tutionalizing the logics of vertical contractualization and the imperatives of management control.
Two chains of accountability have been instituted. On the one hand, by 2006, services were to
be defined ex ante and undertaken on the basis of objectives set within the framework of annual
performance plans; the results were then to be analysed in annual performance reports; plans and
reports were to have performance indicators. On the other hand, Operational Programme Budgets,
which break the overall programme down into segments based on areas of activity or on territories
– each under the authority of an identified operational manager within a ministry – have been
introduced. These mean that, at an intermediate level, national objectives and indicators will be set
out as a programme, in the context of a new hierarchical chain (or “management dialogue”) bet-
ween officials in the field, the people in charge of Operational Programme Budgets, the manager
of the overall Programme and the Budget Directorate. Thus, the Directorate will be able to institu-
tionalize its role in following up budgetary operations. Top civil servants from the Ministry of the
Interior and from the Civil Service Ministry have been worried about this “cascading of financial
responsibilities away from central administrations”, complaining that it “risks verticalizing public
policies and compartmentalizing service activities” (CFDT Cadres, 2004, p. 19).
Confronted by a budgetary crisis and by widespread external initiatives that defend the increa-
sing responsibility and the autonomy of local managers, the Budget Directorate has been gradually
doing its best to promote rules to reorganize hierarchical relations and to transform its instruments
of intervention by creating a double net: devolution of its control function intermeshed with gra-
dual development of an information and management system (through management monitoring
instruments). At first incrementally, then through its negotiation of the LOLF and through a para-
digm shift in budgetary policy, the Budget Directorate has gradually been imposing a financial
view of the steering state reorganization.
2.4. Power struggles within the state: integration at stake and institutional constraints
around a differentiation process
These three strategies, pursued concurrently over the course of the 1990s, illustrate not only
different ways of perceiving the problems that attach to the apparatus of the state but also the
variety of designs available to pattern reorganization of the administrative system. Two facts can
be highlighted.
Firstly, the emergence of new organizational principles seems to be clearly linked to changes in
environment and to internal conflicts between ministries that occupy a central position and play a
transverse role in the state. In outline, the move towards financial bases, Europeanization and the
territorialization of administrative issues all weaken the resources and the positions of the “centra-
list” ministerial actors who have claimed a capacity and a legitimacy to “govern administration”:
their dependence on other groups is highlighted. They are bound to react in order to maintain
their positions, reconsidering how to act so as to preserve the integration and coordination of the
state.
Secondly, analysis shows that the principles and rules of reorganization put forward by the
three centralist ministries are not identical, nor do they correspond to the pure pattern proposed
in major reports on state reform in the 1990s. The concrete making of a new organizational form
is the issue at stake in divergent rationalities and strategies, which illustrate the weight of the
institutional constraints and categorizations that not only influence the perception of problems
and the definition of alternatives but also inform the structure of choices (Thelen, 2003). This
process also reveals the importance of power struggles inside the state, which strongly shape
– as in firms (Fligstein, 1990) – control of organization and choice of organizational form. In
France, administrative reform is embedded in these institutional conflicts, which limit its scope.
The influence of the historical structuring of the state explains this conflict-ridden process of
reorganization: the three ministries and their own ways of ordering things have been the bearers
of contradictory notions about how to organize separation, control and “the operator” established
by devolution. Texts being produced by one or other of the three actors clearly highlight new
organizational principles, but they do so more sharply than the texts produced at the same time by
the “state reform committees” (analysed in Section 1), give an impression of much greater conflict.
The disparity between the coherent organizational form defended in the reports (Section 1) and
the contradictory formulas for reorganization put forward by the centralist ministries (Section
2) suggests we should next seek a parallel process by which other intermediaries produced an
organizational paradigm and became involved in this area.
3. Creating a new model: the visible hand of France’s most senior civil servants from
the grands corps
To sociologists of organizations or proponents of sociological neoinstitutionalism, this disparity
between the model of the steering state produced in the reports and the reality of the measures
adopted in practice comes as no surprise. Though it has allowed some to refer to “organizational
hypocrisy” (Brunsson, 2002), in fact it refers back to various now-classic results that highlight the
disparities between the formal structure of the organization and informal interactions (Crozier and
Friedberg, 1977), between its system of external legitimization and its internal practices (Meyer
and Rowan, 1977), between the “reform talk” phase and implementation (Brunsson and Olsen,
1993). Yet our perspective is distinct from these theses. This article defends the idea that the process
of emergence of a new organizational form itself results from a dual dynamic of production. In
addition to power struggles within the state to impose new rules, there is the process of building
a coherent, overall, widespread organizational model, constituting a common representation or
categorization that can serve as a collective ideal or a guide to action. There were two features
of the process of producing the documents we examined that enabled us to understand the issues
involved in making this new “image of the state” and its nature as a “model” or “driving principle”.
Firstly, the documents we examined were all produced by ad hoc bodies enjoying a fairly
strong autonomy that distanced them from the pressures linked to the practical problems and the
institutional interests that face the transversal ministries analysed above. The two Plan Commis-
sions, the Picq Task Force, the CRE and, to a lesser extent, the team that produced the Juppé
Circular were set up – although under distinctly differing terms – as authorities, to make judg-
ments and recommendations. Competence was ascribed to them and the specific mechanisms of
the way these committees ran – although not entirely immune to external interventions and pres-
sures – offered some autonomy. Significantly, disputes over competence certainly arose within
the “Task Force on the Responsibilities and Organization of the State” (the Picq Task Force),
which met from November 1993 to May 1994 (Bezes, 2002b). On one side were 29 rapporteurs
representing the senior civil service, while on the other side were the eight-person “committee
of wise men” – most of whom were members of the grands corps working in the private sec-
tor – and the writers of the report, four senior civil servants from the Court of State Auditors
(Cour des Comptes) and the Conseil d’État. While the first group, whose job was to give precise
diagnoses on the ministries and their environments, advocated detailed technical reforms, the
second group came out in favour of principles and reorganizations that were more ideological and
radical (decentralization, the transformation of departments into agencies, privatization, giving
responsibility to local levels, etc.). Ultimately, it was the second group alone who produced the
report. In deliberately distancing themselves from well-supported, cautious diagnoses, the authors
of the Picq Report privileged a general direction over detailed reforms; they imported, without
any resistance, the ready-made solutions proposed in foreign reforms or advocated by NPM. The
Prime Minister’s Circular of 26 July 1995, which systematized and publicized the image of a
steering state, was also the work of senior civil servants from “outside the system” (two former
members of the Blanc and Picq Commissions, both by then at the Conseil d’État and an inspector
of finances), who produced a political text intended to legitimize the Prime Minister’s policy.
The CRE, created in September 1995, was also deliberately designed as an autonomous autho-
rity, independent of the Civil Service Ministry, the Budget Directorate and the Ministry of the
Interior. The intention was to constitute a coalition of reformers (about 20 senior civil servants),
which would be united enough to implement a homogeneous reform strategy and to create wide
expertise covering all the rules of the administrative system. Moreover, between November 1995
and March 1996, the CRE drew up an ambitious pilot study for the three-years state reform plan,
which proposed – in 29 reforms and 245 proposals – a new reorganization of the state attaching
great importance to NPM solutions (recentring; clarifying areas of competence; new forms of
delegation or control). These committees thus favoured the transfer of ideas developed elsewhere
since the late 1990s, through the proliferation of networks where neomanagerial “best practices”
are shared within transnational frameworks (Europe, the OECD) or within national frameworks
influenced by public management training bodies such as the Ministry of Finance’s Institute of
Public Management and Economic Development or by consultancies with an “Anglo-Saxon”
culture.
The second feature of the process is that these major reform committees, from the Closets
Commission to the State Reform Commission, mainly consisted of senior civil servants (for
details, Bezes, 2002a) – some from the grands corps de l’État (in the case of the majority of
actual authors of the reports), others who were controllers or from technical and administrative
corps – occupying operational positions in ministries. In the mid 1990s, they all seemed to adopt
the steering state model and to defend an organizational design that stresses separation of the dual
functions and seeks to strengthen strategic functions to the detriment of operational functions.
Many of them held to this principle because it provided a theoretical frame that they considered
helpful in solving the problems they faced, whether these were the problems of the state or the
specific problems of the top French civil service. However, the various subgroups of the French
higher civil service had differing interests and expectations in defending this model, according to
their positions and tasks.
Given the division of labour inside the French administration, it is not surprising that groups of
senior civil servants from the grands corps, who occupy transverse roles outside the operational
ministries, became, in the 1990s, importers and bearers of the steering state model. When viewed
in the light of the British literature on involvement of senior civil servants in the policy of agencifi-
cation of ministerial departments,18 this commitment holds no more surprises. Firstly, top French
bureaucrats found it all the more legitimate to take responsibility for plans to reorganize state archi-
tecture because they have traditionally been the group who carry forward modernization projects
in the French state (Suleiman, 1979). In addition, the steering state model has been confirmed in
many other Western countries and in many international networks as the dominant reorganization
plan. Top bureaucrats were also strongly in favour of the managerial model because it belonged to
the “kit” of ideas developed and legitimized by major accountancy firms and in the private sector.
Secondly, “interests” can also explain why the logic of separation between “steering” and actually
“rowing” has succeeded in winning their approval. The reshaping they suggested has represented
a collective means of reestablishing their political influence by reinforcing “functionally poli-
ticized roles” within the state (strengthening the functions of steering and controlling) and has
helped them to reconfigure their control or enrich it with new tasks. After 1998, for instance,
the Inspection générale des Finances was committed to promoting “benchmarking studies” in
key areas identified as ripe for reform (the tax system, budgetary processes and the performance
management system). So, senior civil servants from the grand corps were the intermediaries of the
steering state model, seeking to produce a new language, common to the state, through new prin-
ciples of reorganization. Throughout the whole period, faced with rivalries between the centralist
ministries and with the impossibility of drawing them into an alliance, they defended the model
of an organizational form that “integrates” the positions of transversal actors and does its best to
impose an ideal reorganization. The dual-function model corresponds to their rationalizing vision.
Thus, in the French context, they have been the chief “mediators” and translators of the domi-
nant standard organizational form advocated by transnational organizations and “Anglo-Saxon”
reformers.
At a lower level, top bureaucrats from controlling bodies (the numerous French inspectorates:
Inspection générale de l’administration, Inspection générale des affaires sociales, etc.) have also
supported the “steering state” model, with a view to revaluing their positions within ministries
and enriching their jobs. The recommendations of the Prada Report on the crisis in “the higher
echelons of the state’s supervisory staff”19 provided primary evidence of how useful the steering
state model could be in reevaluating the importance of the controlling functions within the state.
In this document, reforms of the state’s tasks and structures were considered, by its two authors –
both members of the grands corps of controllers – as the moving force in revalidating the place and
the role of senior civil servants. “Operational management functions are not the only important
functions that the state’s higher managers have to fulfil.” As the Blanc Report – already alluded to
18 Patrick Dunleavy was the precursor of the literature on privatizations (1991); he was followed especially by Oliver
James, writing on the British senior civil servants who originated the “Next Steps” reforms (James, 2003).
19 The whole senior civil service: posts in service management, central administrations or devolved services (directors,
vice-directors, chief officers, préfets, heads of devolved services) or in the administrative bodies in charge of monitoring
and inspection.
– emphasized, in preparation for the 11th Plan, “the state will have to be increasingly a “strategic
state”. We will not go into analytical detail here, but it must be emphasized that the functions of
studying, planning, forecasting and evaluation will have to be fulfilled much better than they are
today: the growing complexity of public policies and the scarcity of resources demand a conside-
rable effort of “strategic knowledge”. A certain number of structures have been created in order
to highlight this challenge, notably the inspections générales. [. . .] However, this much is certain:
strategic planning is a function that, although essential, is currently undervalued and for which
we are currently under-equipped: from now on, the state must attract some of its best senior civil
servants to apply their skills in this area” (Prada, 1994, pp. 14–16). In the early 2000s, these ideas
began to be implemented, with the ongoing reforms of many controlling bodies (inspections géné-
rales of the Ministries of the Interior, Social Affairs and Education). A big “audit, expertise and
consultancy department” has been set up within the Ministry of Finance and will bring together
several inspections générales (Industry and Trade; Post and Telecommunications; Public Monito-
ring). More broadly, the steering state model also provided, in the mid-1990s, a useful solution to
the diagnosis – in several official reports (Prada, 1994; Weiss, 1996; Eymeri and Pavillard, 1997)
– of crisis in “the higher echelons of the state’s supervisory staff”.20 The whole of the “administe-
ring” senior civil service was seen as facing a profound crisis, on two main bases. Firstly, attempts
at career development began to come up against the shortening or acceleration of the “first-level
career” (the central tier, consisting of posts as bureau heads or vice-directors) and against the stag-
nation – due to lack of posts – of the “second-level career” (next-level openings, such as directorial
posts). Secondly, the purchasing power of civil service pay had fallen significantly over a period
of 20 years – most sharply since 1983. This crisis manifested itself through a large, post-1983
increase in senior civil servants leaving for the private sector. This happened in almost all corps and
involved younger and younger senior civil servants. Of course, these dysfunctions did not affect
the different groups within the senior civil service in the same way (Bezes and Le Lidec, 2007).
However, pleading the case in favour of recentring the senior civil service towards more strategic
and functionally politicized tasks represented a “solution” likely to garner approval from most
of them.
However, the effects of this “steering state” model on other subgroups within the administrative
system remain unclear, in that they may suffer important losses as a result of these reforms or
may be ideologically opposed to the development. The benefits for many administrateurs civils
(high-ranking civil servants from the ENA but not for the first three main grands corps) – who
spend much of their careers in central administrations or in devolved units of the state and remain
more involved in technical and operational activities – are much more problematic. On the one
hand, we can hypothesize that senior bureaucrats will favour managerial and efficiency-oriented
reforms, provided that these improve their day-to-day policy activities and increase their capa-
cities and autonomy. Through the new division of labour that they bring in their wake, NPM
reforms may increase these officials’ expertise in specific policies (and their skills as “modern
managers”) and may favour a specialization process based more on “occupation” than on general
skills. These changes may then facilitate further departures to other administrations, public cor-
porations or private companies. On the other hand, it may also be feared that this development
will generate stronger divisions and even subordination between those higher civil servants who
remain “generalist” and politicized and those who emphasize their operational skills but have no
20 The whole senior civil service: posts in service management, central administrations or territorial services of the state
(directors, vice-directors, chief officers, préfets, heads of local units of the state) or in the administrative bodies in charge
of monitoring and inspection.
access to policy-making circles. To a certain extent, the fulsome praise of the modernization of
state management and administration by the Senior Civil Service Associations Group (GAHFP)
in 2002 seems to represent predominantly these operational and career managers: “Senior civil
servants would like it if the political decision makers were to make more demands for the strong
analyses and proposals that they could produce: they have the desire and the capacity to fuel the
democratic debate, to propose avenues for research and to help in setting options’ (GAHFP, 2002,
p. 36). In this bid to be viewed as policy experts within the GAHFP, front-line bureaucrats showed
that they wre worried about their roles, their autonomy and their mobility by comparison with
more politicized senior civil servants.
Therefore, the steering state model also emerged, during the 1990s, from the development
work of networks of senior civil servants who had become associated through the framework
of major transverse committees and were less constrained by ministerial pressures and more
inclined to import the big ideas and solutions of NPM in order to respond to the perceived pro-
blems of the state. Moreover, the principles elaborated in this way are not unconnected with
the first reform networks we analysed. The committees were always closely tracked by civil
servants from the centralist ministries (Interior, Budget, Civil Service) and sometimes inte-
grated into the administrative reform mechanism (as was the case with the CRE), while the
texts produced may also have represented political manifestos for Prime Ministers (the Juppé
Circular).
4. Conclusion: the dual dynamic of constructing an organizational form for the state
This article is offered as a contribution to the study of transformation processes in state organi-
zational forms. Traditionally, two perspectives can be opposed in the literature. The first, guided
by rational choice theory, transaction costs economics or agency theory, is preoccupied above
all with the choice of new organizational forms, with the idea of efficient adaptation to a chan-
ging environment and with a focus on the issue of establishing the political control necessary to
counterbalance administrative autonomy (Horn, 1995). The second, which relies on sociological
neoinstitutionalism, favours the idea that reforms adopt norms of rationality that are viewed as
“myths” present in society or in various professional fields: the state (or the firm) integrates them
and institutionalizes them through mimetism, in order to increase or reconstruct its legitimacy to
outside actors, as well as to found or strengthen the legitimacy of groups in the ascendant or already
in power, which claim these “modern” representations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and
Powell, 1983).
Between these two perspectives, we propose a more nuanced route that will allow us to go
beyond overschematic oppositions. We have shown empirically the importance of two autonomous
but complementary processes that reflect the division of labour inside the state. On the one hand,
the building of principles and instruments of reorganization reflected struggles within the state
between three centralist ministries (Interior, Budget and Civil Service), each faced with changes
in their environment, each with its own resources and interests and each claiming to control –
totally or partly – the whole state. Throughout the 1990s, this rivalry was expressed through the
increasingly general nature of the contents of state reform policy, but also – and above all – through
an opposition between concurrent plans to reorganize hierarchies between the managing body,
central administrations and devolved services. Far from constituting a homogeneous whole, the
state appeared to be an “institutional order” (Orren and Skowronek, 1993, pp. 320–323) made up
of interdependent ministries that, when faced with changes in their environment, developed reform
strategies, did their best to control the games of the other actors in the configuration, deployed
variable, asymmetric resources and operated on non-identical timescales.21 These power struggles
within the state generated repeated conflicts and negotiations, were dominated by issues control-
ling the core rules of the administrative system and shaped the choice of the state’s organizational
form. The recent Institutional Act on Budget Legislation (the LOLF) of 1st August 2001, which
is often presented as the new, legitimate guiding schema, may lead one to think that the Budget
Directorate is now well-placed to impose an economic, managerial vision of reorganization. The
allocation of the “state reform” portfolio to the Budget Minister in the Villepin government was
an early sign of this, marking a clear break with its traditional “ownership” by the Civil Service
Ministry. The creation of a General Directorate for State Modernization within the Finance Minis-
try in July 2005 institutionalized this development. This merged the Directorate for Budgetary
Reform, created within the Finance Ministry in order to manage the LOLF, with three offices
previously attached to the Prime Minister: the Office for Modernization of Public Management
and State Structures, the Office for Service Users and Administrative Simplification and the Elec-
tronic Administration Development Agency. The Fillon Government, under Nicolas Sarkozy’s
presidency, has further strengthened budgetary dominance by creating an enlarged Ministry for
Budgeting, Public Accounts and the Civil Service. The DGAFP therefore finds itself, for the first
time since it was created, part of a finance Ministry. On the other hand, the new organizational
form has been produced as a cultural category by senior civil servants in a more autonomous
position, who have developed a common, coherent representation of “the state”, inspired by the
recommendations of NPM.
The decoupling of the two processes, highlighted as a classic outcome in the neoinstitutionalist
sociology of organizations (Dobbin, 1995), has here been related to concrete causal mechanisms
and to groups identified inside the state. However, this gap does not prevent interaction between
the two processes. The idealized categorization of the organization came to influence political
reform processes by stressing the historical ineluctability of change, while the measures negotiated
between ministries were integrated, synthesized and digested in reports produced by senior civil
servants, so that specifically French elements became mixed with NPM standards. The new
organizational form therefore emerged slowly from the melting-pot of the issues of control,
integration and legitimation of the whole state, from the power struggles taking place there and
from groups of actors doing their best in a given configuration and at a given period.
Through the diachronic perspective proposed, two complementary and indissociable dimen-
sions of organizational forms have been highlighted empirically (Dobbin, 1995; Koza and
Thoenig, 2003, p. 1226). The organizational form first refers to a material and political dimen-
sion, the major issue of conflicts of interest, which relates to the chains of hierarchical authority
that govern relations between the multiple levels of an organization (distribution of tasks, circu-
lation of information and modes of control). However, an organizational form also possesses an
ideal dimension because it is the idealized representation of a complex social reality, a cultural
construction. As a cognitive and normative map of the organization, it constitutes an institutiona-
lized category (Durkheim and Mauss, 1971; Douglas, 1999) that is capable of representing and
informing the multiple practical activities internal to the state (to the firm) and capable of “revea-
ling” the state; yet it also provides a basis for and strengthens the legitimacy of groups – either
in the ascendant or already in power – that claim this codified vision and use it to legitimize the
organization to outsiders (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The emergence
of an organizational form results, in our view, from this dual dynamics.
21 Some are older than others, have accumulated more experience and expertise, are more permanent than others, etc.
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